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The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not
Be an All or Nothing Proposition†
MARTIN H. MALIN*
INTRODUCTION
The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) would prohibit provisions in
employment, consumer, and franchise agreements that obligate a party to arbitrate
claims that arise out of those relationships.1 Following the election of President
Obama and substantial Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress, it
appeared that the bill had a reasonable chance of passage.2 Although changes in the
political winds now make passage unlikely, Congress has enacted mini-AFAs on a
piecemeal basis. For example, the 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act
bans pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate sexual harassment claims under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or in tort. The act applies to employment contracts
of defense contractors whose business with the Department of Defense (DOD)
exceeds $1 million.3 More recently, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act prohibits pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims under
the statute’s commodities and securities whistleblower provisions.4
The debate over pre-dispute arbitration agreements has been polarized with
proponents opposing any legislative regulations and opponents seeking a complete
prohibition.5 Although the AFA would ban such agreements in consumer and

† Copyright © 2012 Martin H. Malin.
* Professor and Director, Institute for Law and the Workplace, Chicago-Kent College
of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. The author is also an arbitrator and serves inter alia
on the Employment Arbitration Roster of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and
also serves as co-chair of the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) Committee on Issues
in Employment Dispute Resolution. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the AAA or NAA. The author gratefully acknowledges
helpful comments on a prior draft from Sharon Henderson Ellis, Theodore St. Antoine, and
Barry Winograd; excellent research assistance from Jacqueline Zablocki, Chicago-Kent
Class of 2011; and financial support from the Marshall-Ewell Research Fund at ChicagoKent.
1. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
2. See Sharon Henderson Ellis, Improving Due Process in Employment Arbitration, in
ARBITRATION 2009: DUE PROCESS IN THE WORKPLACE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTY-SECOND
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 41, 48 (Paul D. Staudohar ed.,
2010); Margaret L. Moses, The Pretext of Textualism: Disregarding Stare Decisis in 14 Penn
Plaza v. Pyett, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 825, 856−58 (2010).
3. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a),
123 Stat. 3409, 3454 (2009).
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203
§ 748(n)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2)); id.
§§ 922(b), (c), 124 Stat. at 1841 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(e)(1), (2)).
5. Compare, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against
the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267 (2008), with David S.
Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247 (2009).

290

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:289

franchise transactions as well as in employment, my focus is exclusively on
employment. Proponents of employer-imposed arbitration systems hail such
measures as providing relatively inexpensive vehicles for addressing employee
claims that are more accessible than the courts and in which employees fare at least
as well as they do in court.6 Opponents approach such claims with deep skepticism.
They observe that these plans are imposed unilaterally by employers and are
uniformly opposed by plaintiffs’ lawyers. They reason that this polarized approach
to employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates must reflect a tilting of the
playing field to the advantage of the employer doing the imposing.7
In this Article, I take the middle ground in the legislative debate. I advocate that
legislative reform is needed to curb employer abuses and to ensure fairness in
employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates. In Part I, I review the current
state of our knowledge about the experience in employment litigation and
employment arbitration. The picture that emerges is not very clear, although I
ultimately conclude that while increased clarity would be helpful, it is not
necessary in resolving the debate over legislative reform. In Part II, I consider
employer motives for imposing pre-dispute arbitration mandates on employees. I
find a mixed bag of abusive and legitimate motives. In Part III, I demonstrate how
courts have abdicated their responsibility to police employer-imposed pre-dispute
arbitration mandates and have undermined efforts by arbitrators and arbitration
service providers to self-regulate. In Part IV, I propose legislative reforms to curb
employer abuses and argue that such reforms are superior to the AFA’s absolute
prohibition on employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates.
I. EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: WHAT DO WE
REALLY KNOW?
Empirical studies are the current rage in the legal academy. It is therefore not
surprising that we can find many empirical analyses of litigation and arbitration. In
this Part, I survey some of the most revealing analyses, integrating their results with
generally understood characteristics of litigation and arbitration.

6. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 559 (2001); Peter
B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEORGETOWN J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 549 (2008);
Theodore J. St. Antoine, ADR in Labor and Employment Law During the Past Quarter
Century, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 411 (2010) [hereinafter St. Antoine, ADR]; Theodore
J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM. 783 (2008) [hereinafter St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration].
7. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1259−60 (“[A]ll indications are that arbitration
agreements are enforced almost uniformly by defendants and rarely, if ever, by consumers or
employees. . . . Unless we assume that the parties are acting on bad information, and
ultimately contrary to their interests, it gives rise to an inference that arbitration favors
defendants.” (footnote omitted)).
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A. Employment Litigation
AFA proponents decry the enforcement of employer-imposed pre-dispute
arbitration mandates for allowing “corporate defendants [to] opt out of the court
system by the simple expedient of writing arbitration agreements into their standard
form contracts.”8 Yet when one considers the employer advantage in employment
litigation in federal court, one is left wondering why an employer would ever want
to leave the federal court system. A study by Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab
published in 2009 comparing data from the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts to similar data they had studied five years earlier paints a graphic
picture of a federal court playing field that is anything but level for plaintiffs in
employment cases. They summarized their findings:
Today employment discrimination plaintiffs still must swim against a
strong tide—in the federal district court and on appeal. Findings for
these cases compared to other civil cases include fewer early
terminations and more trials; lower success rates for plaintiffs by
settlement and lower plaintiff win rates at pretrial adjudication and trial,
especially judge trial; and more appeals. Maybe the situation has not
gone from bad to worse in the last five years. But those plaintiffs may
have gone from merely faring badly to feeling bad about their chances
for success, which would affect their litigation behavior.9
Professors Clermont and Schwab found that from 1998 to 2006, plaintiffs won
10.88% of Title VII cases, 9.12% of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cases,
11.24% of § 1983 cases, 11.67% of Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) cases, 10.96% of § 1981 cases, and 19.55% of Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) cases.10 From 1979 to 2006, plaintiffs won 15% of employment cases
in federal district courts, whereas plaintiffs in other types of cases won 51% of the
time.11 In cases resolved by pre-trial motions, plaintiffs in employment cases won
only 3.59% of the time, compared to a plaintiff win rate in other cases of 21.05%.12
The employment plaintiff win rate at trial was 28.47%, compared to a win rate of
44.94% for plaintiffs in other types of cases.13 The difference in plaintiff win rates
was particularly dramatic in bench trials, where the employment plaintiff win rate
was only 19.62% versus plaintiffs in other cases who won 45.53% of the time.14
When plaintiffs did win in the trial court, their victories were often fleeting.
When defendants appealed plaintiff victories at trial, they secured reversals 41.10%
of the time.15 In contrast, where defendants won at trial, plaintiffs secured reversals

8. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1254.
9. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 131 (2009).
10. Id. at 116–17.
11. Id. at 127.
12. Id. at 128.
13. Id. at 129.
14. Id. at 130.
15. Id. at 110.
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on appeal only 8.72% of the time.16 Professors Clermont and Schwab suggested
that the dramatic success rate that defendants enjoyed in the courts of appeals may
have made them more reluctant to settle cases. “Defendants may be marginally less
willing to settle, early or at all, when they know they can get a favorable second
chance in the courts of appeal should they lose at trial.”17 Regardless of the reasons,
employment cases in federal court were significantly less likely to settle than other
types of cases, with 37% of employment cases ending early in the litigation as
opposed to 59% of other cases.18
Litigation is a particularly inhospitable forum for claims of moderate value. A
1995 survey of plaintiffs’ employment lawyers revealed that an employee required
a minimum of $60,000 in damages, not including consequential or punitive
damages, for the case to be worthwhile to a lawyer to litigate.19 A fall 2010 update
suggests that accounting for inflation, the current minimum amount would be
$84,000, which contrasts with the average $14,000 economic loss for employees
who lose their jobs.20 The inhospitable nature of litigation toward claims of modest
value has not been lost on the courts. For example, in Gentry v. Superior Court,21
the California Supreme Court held that a class action waiver contained in an
arbitration agreement was invalid under state law because it effectively exculpated
the employer from liability under state wage and hour laws because wage and hour
awards tended to be modest, particularly in light of the practical difficulties and
length of time involved in adjudicating them.22 However, unlike systematic wage
and hour claims, most claims of modest value are not likely to lend themselves to
class action treatment.
B. Arbitration
A number of studies have compared how employees fare in arbitration versus
litigation. They have examined employee win rates and amounts recovered. Almost
all of the early studies focused on outcomes in employment arbitrations

16. Id.
17. Id. at 124.
18. Id. at 122. Some state courts might provide a more hospitable forum for certain
types of wrongful discharge claims. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An
Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury
Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511,
535–49 (2003) (finding much higher plaintiff win rates in jury verdicts in California state
courts, particularly in sexual harassment cases, but also finding that state court win rates
were significantly lower for racial discrimination cases brought by African Americans and
for discrimination claims brought by black women).
19. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What
Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.–Dec. 1995, at 40,
44−45.
20. Brief for National Workrights Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
12–13, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-839).
21. 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007).
22. See id. at 563–64. Gentry’s holding is likely no longer valid in light of AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA).23 These studies
engendered debates over their methodologies24 as is often the case with empirical
studies. Regardless of the merits of their methodology, however, a key drawback of
these studies is that they all relied on data from arbitrations decided prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.25 Prior to that
decision, the lower courts were divided over whether section 1 of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), which excludes “contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce,”26 excluded most employment contracts from FAA coverage. In Circuit
City, the Court interpreted the exclusion narrowly to apply only to employees in
interstate transportation.27 The uncertainty in this area of the law inhibited many
employers from imposing pre-dispute arbitration mandates on their employees. The
Court’s decision in Circuit City undoubtedly led to a significant increase in the use
of pre-dispute arbitration mandates.
More recent empirical analysis comes primarily from Alexander Colvin.28
Professor Colvin has analyzed data filed by AAA as required by the California
Code of Civil Procedure that reflects all arbitrations under employer-imposed
arbitration plans administered by AAA nationwide. He initially reported his
findings at a national conference sponsored by the National Academy of
Arbitrators, “Beyond the Protocol: The Future of Due Process in Workplace
Dispute Resolution,” (“NAA Due Process Conference”) held in April 2007.29 He
updated his research in a paper published in 2011.30 His results appear to confirm

23. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and
Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003–
Jan. 2004, at 44; Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of
Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 777 (2003); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment
Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29 (1998). The major exception
was Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, Comparing Litigation and Arbitration of
Employment Disputes: Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights in Litigation?, 6 A.B.A.
CONFLICT MGMT. 1 (2003), which used data from the New York Stock Exchange and
National Association of Securities Dealers.
24. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1287−1307 (critiquing the earlier studies,
particularly Eisenberg & Hill); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to
Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration, 41 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 843, 848−58 (2008) (detailing methodological shortcomings of empirical
studies on employment arbitration).
25. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
26. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
27. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115–19.
28. See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration:
Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Colvin,
Case Outcomes]; Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration:
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405 (2007) [hereinafter
Colvin, Empirical Research].
29. Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 28.
30. Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 28.
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some of the presumed favorable characteristics of employment arbitration while
raising intriguing questions about others.
One of the most often repeated presumed advantages of arbitration is its relative
speed compared to litigation. The early studies of employment arbitration seemed
to support this belief.31 Professor Colvin’s work confirmed the speed advantage of
arbitration. He found that the mean time to resolve a case that proceeded to hearing
and award was approximately one year;32 in contrast, litigation takes at least twice
as long.33 Moreover, simply comparing time from filing of the claim to a decision
by the adjudicator may understate the speed advantage of arbitration, particularly in
cases in which the employee prevails. Given that employers who lose in federal
district courts win on appeal almost half the time, one can reasonably expect that a
victorious plaintiff will be met with a notice of appeal. In contrast, the grounds for
judicial review of arbitration awards are extremely narrow.34
A second characteristic urged by arbitration proponents is its greater
accessibility relative to litigation, especially for lower income claimants and lower
value claims. Professor Colvin’s work provides support for this claim. In his 2011
paper, which analyzed all AAA administered cases under employer-imposed plans
from January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2007, Professor Colvin found that
82.4% of the claimants for whom such information was available had salaries under
$100,000.35 The median amount claimed was $106,151,36 and 25% of the claims
were for $36,000 or less,37 with 10% for $10,000 or less.38 This compares very
favorably to estimates that an employment claim must involve economic damages
alone, that is, not including consequential or punitive damages, of at least $60,000–
$84,000 to be worth litigating.39 AAA rules go a long way to ensuring accessibility
by providing that, except for a modest filing fee paid by the employee, all costs
including AAA fees and arbitrator fees must be paid by the employer.40 Thus, it is
not surprising that Professor Colvin found that employers paid 100% of arbitration
fees 97% of the time.41
Earlier studies found employee success rates in arbitration that were comparable
to or better than employee success rates in litigation. Professor Colvin’s analysis of
AAA data shows considerably lower employee success rates. In particular, he

31. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 23, at 51; Hill, supra note 23, at 822; Maltby,
supra note 23, at 55.
32. Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 28, at 8 (361.5 days); Colvin, Empirical
Research, supra note 28, at 426 (332 days).
33. See Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 28, at 426; Eisenberg & Hill, supra note
23, at 51 tbl.3.
34. See Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008) (discussing
some courts’ willingness to review arbitral legal conclusions for manifest disregard of the
law).
35. Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 28, at 10−11 tbl.2.
36. Id. at 10.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
40. Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures: Costs of Employment
Arbitration, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904#cost.
41. Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 28, at 9.
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found that in the period January 1, 2003, through December 31, 2007, employees
won 21.4% of the cases that proceeded to arbitral award.42 Professor Colvin
compared this to other researchers’ estimates of employee success rates in litigation
and concluded that there is an “arbitration-litigation gap,” with employees faring
less well in arbitration.43 On the other hand, even this low employee success rate in
arbitration compares favorably to the employee success rates in federal court found
by Professors Clermont and Schwab.44 Regardless of whether the arbitration gap
exists, as Professor Colvin points out, considerable research is needed to determine
what may account for that gap.
There are many factors that may serve to depress the employee success rate in
arbitrations that produce final awards relative to litigations that produce final
judgments. Professor Colvin found that employee success rates varied with
employee salaries. Employees with salaries below $100,000 won 22.7% of the
time, those with salaries between $100,001 and $250,000 won 31.4% of the time,
and those with salaries above $250,001 won 42.9% of the time.45 Employees with
higher incomes will generally have claims that are worth more because of higher
back pay amounts and will generally have greater resources to invest in their cases.
Thus, it is not surprising that higher income employees have a greater success rate
than their lower income counterparts. To the extent that arbitration is a more
accessible forum for lower income employees, that accessibility might depress the
employee win rate relative to litigation.
Claims are also far less likely to be dismissed or adjudicated on summary
judgment in arbitration than in litigation. At one time, it was thought that summary
disposition was completely unavailable in arbitration. Noted plaintiffs’ attorney
Paul Tobias touted arbitration because “[t]he employer can’t get summary
judgment in arbitration. . . . The employee gets an absolute right to tell the story to
a neutral party.”46 Although the absolute bar has been lifted, summary disposition
remains relatively rare in arbitration. Under AAA Employment Arbitration Rules, a
party must obtain leave from the arbitrator to even file a dispositive motion. The
rules provide that for the arbitrator to allow the filing there must be a showing of
“substantial cause that the motion is likely to succeed and dispose of or narrow the
issues in the case.”47 If arbitration weeds out fewer weak claims through dispositive
motions than litigation does, we would expect the claimant success rate following
hearing to be lower.

42. Id. at 5–6.
43. Id. at 6.
44. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
45. Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 28, at 10. Note that all of these figures exceed
the overall 21.4% employee win rate. I assume that this is because employee salary data was
missing from a substantial number of cases in Professor Colvin’s data set, and thus his
analysis based on employee income level could not consider every case that he considered in
calculating overall employee win rate.
46. Paul Tobias, Proceedings of the 1997 Annual Meeting Association of American Law
School Sections on Employment Discrimination Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 269, 283 (1997).
47. Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures: Rule 27, AM. ARB. ASS’N
(2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904#27.
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Professor Colvin’s 2007 paper reported that in 25.1% of the arbitration cases,
employees proceeded pro se.48 Not surprisingly, the win rate for employees
represented by counsel was significantly higher than the win rate for those who
represented themselves.49 To the extent that arbitration is more amenable to selfrepresentation than litigation, this too may depress relative employee success rates.
Another factor that may depress employee success rates in arbitrations that go to
award arises from the way in which many employers use arbitration. Many
employers incorporate arbitration as a final step in a multi-step employee dispute
resolution process. Many require mediation prior to resorting to arbitration and
many provide incentives for resolution at the mediation stage. To the extent that
such dispute resolution systems encourage settlement, it may be that the claims that
proceed to arbitral hearing are, as a group, weaker than the claims that proceed to
trial in court.
Ultimately, however, whether an arbitration-litigation gap exists and the reasons
for such a gap are not particularly relevant to questions of statutory reform. Even if
we assume the existence of a gap that can be attributed to employer abuses, before
we decide to prohibit all pre-dispute arbitration mandates, we need to ask whether
there is anything worth preserving in employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration
mandates and, if so, how to preserve it. With this inquiry in mind, I turn to the
question of why employers impose such mandates on their employees.
II. WHY DO EMPLOYERS IMPOSE ARBITRATION?
As previously noted, AFA supporters infer that employment arbitration likely
tilts the playing field to the advantage of employers because only plaintiffs seek to
avoid it and only employers seek to enforce employer-imposed pre-dispute
arbitration mandates.50 Although this makes for good rhetoric, when more closely
scrutinized the argument lacks substance. It is true that the reporters are filled with
cases where employee-plaintiffs sought to litigate and employer-defendants moved
to dismiss or compel arbitration. It is also likely that reported cases where
employers sought to litigate and employees sought to compel arbitration are nonexistent. Furthermore, many, perhaps most, plaintiffs’ attorneys are opposed to
employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates. But these facts do not support
an inference that employer-imposed arbitration tilts the playing field in favor of
employers.
It is not surprising that virtually all reported litigation consists of plaintiffs
resisting defense efforts to compel arbitration. I would not expect to find anything
else. If plaintiff’s counsel determines that it is strategically better to be in court
rather than before an arbitrator, counsel will file suit and resist arbitration. If
defense counsel shares plaintiff’s counsel’s preference for litigation, defense
counsel will not move to compel arbitration and the matter will proceed in court. A
court has no authority to compel arbitration sua sponte. If defense counsel,
however, considers it strategically better to arbitrate, counsel will move to compel

48. Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 28, at 432.
49. Id. at 433.
50. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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arbitration. What the reported cases do not tell us is how often employees’ counsel
simply file arbitration demands.
Of course if we had data on how often employees’ counsel file arbitration
demands, the data would not lend itself to any inference. What we would not know
is how often counsel filed the demand after determining that arbitrating was in the
employee’s interest and how often counsel filed the demand because, as the law has
developed, resisting arbitration would not likely be successful. We simply cannot
draw any inferences from the conduct of parties in litigation or otherwise.
AFA proponents point to the position of the plaintiffs’ bar. I will assume that the
plaintiffs’ employment bar is unified in its opposition to employer-imposed
pre-dispute arbitration mandates, although there is no way to prove it. At most, this
opposition shows that lawyers who represent employee-plaintiffs have concluded
that employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates are not in the lawyers’
interests. No inference may be drawn that such plans are not in the interests of
employees.
Clyde Summers, after analyzing data from studies of wrongful discharge
litigation in California, found that there was a large disparity in recovery among
litigants. Even for litigants who received high jury verdicts, post-trial appeals and
settlements substantially reduced final payments, and attorney contingency fees and
reimbursement of litigation costs reduced the employee’s net recovery even
further.51 Professor Summers found that most wrongfully discharged employees
received modest or inadequate awards, often little more than half their economic
losses, and had to wait three to five years after their discharges for any recovery.52
He further found that the wide disparity in awards bore little resemblance to the
plaintiffs’ economic losses.53 He concluded that the litigation system resulted in “a
lottery in which many receive nothing, most receive less than their economic loss,
while a lucky few win the jackpot.”54
We know that plaintiffs’ attorneys carefully screen employment cases and reject
the overwhelming majority of cases that come their way.55 They have to do so to
maximize the likelihood that the cases they pick will win the lottery. Prohibiting
pre-dispute arbitration mandates in employment may very well be in the interests of
plaintiffs’ attorneys who can cherry pick the best and most valuable cases and who
can aim, over a wide spectrum of cases, to settle most, lose some, and win the
lottery enough times to make it worthwhile; but the plaintiffs’ bar’s support for the
AFA says nothing about whether the AFA is in the best interests of employees
generally, particularly those whose claims or resources preclude their securing
counsel.
On the other hand, if imposing pre-dispute arbitration mandates so thoroughly
advantages employers as AFA proponents contend, we would expect to find a large
majority of employers adopting such plans. But the evidence is clear that this has

51. Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines
and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 464–65 (1992).
52. Id. at 466.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 6, at 790−91.
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not occurred. Professor Colvin estimated that 15–25% of employers imposed
arbitration mandates.56 Professor St. Antoine reported:
At a recent meeting of labor and employment lawyers in Michigan, I
could not find a single top management attorney who was currently
advising clients to start or retain a mandatory arbitration system. Three
reasons were given: Employees win too often; it is hard to get summary
judgment in arbitration; and full appellate review is not available.57
Citing, among other things, the absence of appeals and the rarity of dismissals or
summary judgments in arbitration, the senior counsel of Raytheon Company
reported that his company had discontinued its imposed pre-dispute arbitration
mandate.58
Sophisticated plaintiffs’ class counsel have recognized the advantages of
arbitration for individual claims that may not be of high value and may be brought
by pro se claimants. In the famous Shakman cases against patronage hiring
practices by the City of Chicago and Cook County, the most recent Agreed
Settlement Order and Accord in the city case provides for post-Accord claimants to
submit their claims of unlawful political discrimination in employment to the city’s
Inspector General’s Office, which investigates and sustains or does not sustain the
claim.59 In either case, the inspector general notifies the claimant of the finding and
his or her right to demand arbitration before one of ten arbitrators appointed by the
court.60 The arbitrator conducts the proceedings in accordance with AAA
Employment Arbitration Rules and renders a decision that is final.61 A consent
decree in the litigation with Cook County contains similar provisions.62 Although
claimants retain their right to bypass the inspector general and arbitration processes
and file suit in federal court, the expectation is that most will not do so given that
many will appear pro se and the monetary values of their claims will not be high
enough to justify litigating.
Evidence concerning employer motivation for imposing pre-dispute arbitration
mandates presents a mixed picture. Employers are more likely to mandate
arbitration following their own encounters with the litigation system.63 Usually,

56. Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 28, at 411.
57. St. Antoine, ADR, supra note 6, at 421.
58. Charles D. Coleman, Is Mandatory Employment Arbitration Living Up to Its
Expectations? A View from the Employer’s Perspective, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227
(2010).
59. Agreed Settlement Order and Accord, Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook Cnty.,
No. 69 C 2145 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
60. Id. at 26–27.
61. Id. at 27–29.
62. Supplemental Relief Order for Cook County, Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook
Cnty., No. 69 C 2145, at 24–26 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2006).
63. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-97-157, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS’ EXPERIENCES WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 8 (1997) [hereinafter
GAO, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION]; Richard A. Bales & Jason N.W. Plowman,
Compulsory Arbitration as Part of a Broader Employment Dispute Resolution Process: The
Anheuser-Busch Example, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 10 (2008).
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employers impose arbitration as the final step in a broader dispute resolution
program. Their aim is to resolve employee claims quickly and relatively
inexpensively. Indeed, speed and cost savings often go hand-in-hand. The faster a
claim is resolved, the lower the employer’s attorney fees and the lower the
exposure to back pay liability.64
But significant abuses exist. The poster child for an abusive arbitration system
was the one that Hooters imposed on its employees.65 The Hooters arbitration rules
required the employee to state the nature of her claim and the specific acts or
omissions on which the claim was based and to provide a list of witnesses with a
summary of the facts known to each, but imposed no similar requirements on the
employer.66 The rules restricted the supposedly neutral arbitrator to those on a list
completely controlled by Hooters.67 Furthermore, the rules allowed Hooters to seek
summary judgment, to record the hearing, and to sue to vacate the award if the
arbitration panel exceeded its authority, but gave no similar rights to the
employee.68 Lastly, the rules allowed the employer to amend them at any time
without notice to the employee and allowed the company, but not the employee, to
cancel the agreement to arbitrate by giving thirty days’ notice.69
The arbitration-happy Fourth Circuit characterized the system that Hooters
established as “a sham system unworthy even of the name of arbitration.”70 It
concluded that Hooters had breached its duty to establish a fair and impartial
system and ordered the agreement to arbitrate rescinded.71
Employers need not go as far as Hooters did to impose pre-dispute arbitration
mandates on their employees that tilt the playing field to the employer’s advantage.
One way to tilt the playing field is to include in the arbitration provision a
prohibition on maintaining a class action or even a consolidated action, leaving any
employee to bring the case as an individual claim. Such abusive provisions are
prevalent in certain consumer contracts. For example, Theodore Eisenberg,
Geoffrey Miller, and Emily Sherwin examined the contracts of leading companies
in the telecommunications, financial services, and credit industries.72 They

64. For example, Professors Sherwyn, Estreicher, and Heise studied one company that
imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates on its employees as the final step in a multi-step
dispute resolution process. They found that most claims were resolved in the earlier steps of
the process, that most claimants remained employed by the company even after the dispute
was resolved, and that the company was able to cut its attorney fees in half. David Sherwyn,
Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New
Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1581−89 (2005). For other examples,
see GAO, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 63; Bales & Plowman, supra note
63; Michael Z. Green, Ethical Incentives for Employers in Adopting Legal Service Plans to
Handle Employment Disputes, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 395, 409−10 (2006).
65. See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
66. Id. at 938.
67. Id. at 938−39.
68. Id. at 939.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 940.
71. Id.
72. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
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compared the companies’ consumer, employment, and material contracts and found
that 76.9% of the companies’ consumer contracts and 92.9% of their employment
contracts mandated arbitration, but only 23.7% of their materials contracts, that is,
the contracts with other businesses, did so.73 All of the consumer contracts with
arbitration provisions also prohibited class action arbitrations and 80% prohibited
all class actions.74 In contrast, none of the consumer contracts without arbitration
mandates prohibited class actions.75 A study by the Searle Civil Justice Institute of
AAA consumer arbitrations found that every arbitration agreement involving cell
phone services and credit cards prohibited class actions.76 In these contracts,
consumer claims are likely to be of extremely low value and simply will not be
pursued without the ability to bring class actions. Professors Eisenberg, Miller, and
Sherwin concluded that the companies imposed arbitration agreements as a vehicle
for precluding class actions.77
Interestingly, Eisenberg and his colleagues found that although employment predispute arbitration mandates were almost universal among the companies they
studied, none of the companies prohibited class actions.78 Nevertheless, there is
considerable evidence that some employers impose arbitration mandates as a
vehicle for prohibiting class actions.79 Although the percentage of employment
claims that are too low value to be worth litigating or arbitrating other than on a
class-wide basis is undoubtedly much lower than for claims arising out of cell
phones and credit cards, there are many employment claims that fall into this
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008).
73. Id. at 882−83 & tbl.2.
74. Id. at 884−85 & tbls.3, 5.
75. Id. at 890.
76. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION PRELIMINARY REPORT 103 (2009).
77. Eisenberg et al., supra note 72, at 888−92.
78. Id. at 884, tbl.3.
79. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and
Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379,
427 & n.121 (2006). Sometimes these provisions may backfire on employers. I presided over
an arbitration administered by AAA that was initially brought as a class action in state court.
The court enforced the arbitration provision and class action waiver in the employment
contract and compelled the employee to arbitrate on an individual basis. Over the next few
months approximately forty other individuals filed similar arbitration demands. All were
represented by the same law firm who represented the first claimant. They were assigned to
different arbitrators. In case management conferences, defense counsel complained
frequently of duplicative discovery demands made in the cases and of claimants’ counsel
noticing the same managers for deposition in every case. Moreover, under AAA rules, in
arbitrations under employer-promulgated plans, the employer pays all costs except for a
nominal filing fee paid by the employee. AAA requires employers to deposit an amount
equal to the arbitrator’s estimate of his or her fee in the event the case proceeds to hearing
and award. Arbitrators tend to estimate on the high side to ensure that the deposits will not
fall short of the entire fee. I do not know what other arbitrators required but using my own
required deposit as a guide, it is quite likely that the employer was required to deposit more
than $500,000 in up front arbitrator fees to cover the forty cases. A global settlement of all
cases was reached. Although I cannot know this for a fact, it seems reasonable to me that the
claimants had considerable leverage in settlement precisely because each case was
proceeding as an individual arbitration with the employer paying all arbitration fees.
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category.80 Moreover, there is simply no reason for a class action waiver other than
to insulate an employer from liability for breaches of its statutory or common law
duties. The incorporation of class action waivers is a clear abuse of
employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates.
Two other provisions that can only be characterized as abuses of
employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates are those that limit remedies
and that reduce the limitations period for bringing a claim. Neither one serves any
purpose other than to tilt the playing field to the employer’s advantage. They
preclude claims that could have proceeded in court because they were filed within
the statutory limitations period but outside the contractual limitations period.81
One provision that could have legitimate justifications but has come to be
regarded as an abusive provision requires the parties to share equally the costs of
the arbitration, including the arbitrator’s fees. At one time, it was thought that fee
sharing was important to ensure arbitral impartiality and the Due Process Protocol
for employment arbitration provided for such fee splitting for this reason.82
However, it has come to be recognized that fee-splitting provisions can actually
serve to render the arbitral forum inhospitable to employee claims. Billing rates for
employment arbitration tend to be considerably higher than billing rates for labor,
that is, union-management, arbitration.83 Furthermore, most employment arbitrators
require payment up front of the estimated total fee for the proceeding.
Consequently, requiring employees to be responsible for an equal share of the
arbitrator’s fees can deter the bringing of claims.84 On the other hand, it has also
been recognized that most arbitrators will not care who is paying them, only that
they are being paid, and thus providing for the employer to absorb the full costs of
the arbitration proceeding does not endanger arbitrator impartiality.85
There is an acute need to police against abusive provisions in employer-imposed
pre-dispute arbitration mandates because it is the employer that unilaterally drafts
the provisions. Unfortunately, as demonstrated in the next Part, the courts have
largely abdicated their policing responsibilities.

80. See, e.g., Brief for National Workrights Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 5–13, AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (giving
examples).
81. For a particularly abusive example, see Mary Kay Morrow, Binding Mandatory
Arbitration of Employment Claims: The Story of Mary Kay Morrow, in Hearing on H.R.
3010 Before the H. Subcomm. on Comm. and Admin. Law, Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 87 (2007) (describing enforcement of a provision that required employee to file
arbitration demand within thirty days of the conclusion of the employer’s internal dispute
resolution process).
82. A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising
out of the Employment Relationship, DISP. RES. J., Oct.–Dec. 1995, at 39.
83. See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to
Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment
Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143, 160 (2002).
84. For example, in Brady v. Williams Capital Grp., L.P., the arbitrator fees that AAA
required be deposited totaled $42,300. 928 N.E.2d 383, 385 (N.Y. 2010). Thus, under a feesplitting arrangement, the employee would have to deposit $21,150 up front just to proceed
with the case.
85. See Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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III. THE INADEQUACY OF JUDICIAL POLICING
At the NAA Due Process Conference, I documented the failure of judicial
policing of due process in employment arbitration and the need for self-regulation
by the arbitration community.86 In this Part, I draw on and update that analysis. I
find that the situation has only worsened in the intervening four years. Indeed, as
developed below, the courts have gone beyond abdicating their policing
responsibilities and have endangered the ability of the arbitral community to selfregulate.
There are two primary vehicles for judicial policing of abusive provisions in
employer-imposed arbitration mandates: the requirement that the arbitral forum be
one in which employees are able to vindicate their claims effectively, and the
common law contract doctrine of unconscionability. The first has effectively failed,
and the Supreme Court has recently dealt the second two blows that could turn out
to be fatal.
In Cole v. Burns International Security Services,87 the D.C. Circuit seized the
requirement that employees be able to vindicate their claims effectively in the
arbitral forum as a mandate for courts to police the procedural fairness of the
arbitration system. The court set forth guidelines against which it would measure an
employer-imposed arbitration mandate, enforcing it only if it:
(1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal
discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types
of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not
require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators’
fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum.88
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has completely undermined judicial policing
of employer-imposed arbitration mandates by placing a heavy burden on an
employee resisting arbitration to prove in the employee’s individual case that the
system impedes his or her ability to vindicate effectively the statutory claim in the
arbitral forum and by deferring most such issues to the arbitrator for resolution. In
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, the Court rejected Cole’s bright line
requirement that the employer pay all arbitral fees except for a nominal filing fee
and held, instead, that whether a requirement that a consumer (or employee) pay a
percentage of the arbitrator’s fee impeded effective vindication of claims in the
arbitral forum must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with the burden on the
party resisting arbitration to prove the impediment.89
A rule that requires employers to limit employees to paying only a nominal
amount of forum costs if they want their arbitration agreements enforced is largely
self-enforcing, as employers must provide in their plans for employees to pay only
nominal fees. In contrast, Randolph effectively mandates pre-arbitration litigation

86. Martin H. Malin, Due Process in Employment Arbitration: The State of the Law and
the Need for Self-Regulation, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 363 (2007).
87. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
88. Id. at 1482 (emphasis omitted).
89. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).

2012]

ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT

303

over fee allocation. The prospect of costly and uncertain litigation likely deters
many claimants from challenging a plan’s allocation of arbitral fees, even where
the prospect of being assessed large fees deters them from bringing their claims to
arbitration.90
In PacifiCare Health Systems v. Book, the Supreme Court began signaling lower
courts to refer to arbitrators questions concerning the adequacy of an arbitral forum
to vindicate statutory rights.91 In PacifiCare, the Court held that whether an
arbitration clause precluding “punitive or exemplary damages” precluded treble
damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
and was thus unenforceable, was for the arbitrator to decide.92 It characterized the
contracts’ limitations on the arbitrator’s remedial authority as “ambiguous” and
reasoned, “[W]e should not, on the basis of ‘mere speculation’ that an arbitrator
might interpret these ambiguous agreements in a manner that casts their
enforceability into doubt, take upon ourselves the authority to decide the antecedent
question of how the ambiguity is to be resolved.”93 The Court held that the lower
courts should have compelled arbitration.94
To resolve the issue of arbitral remedial authority, the arbitrator will, of
necessity, have to decide whether RICO treble damages are punitive or
compensatory. Significantly, the Court did not hold in PacifiCare that RICO treble
damages are not punitive in nature. It merely observed that, in prior decisions, it
had characterized various statutory treble damage provisions as serving remedial as
well as punitive functions.95 Thus, the Court left it to the arbitrator in PacifiCare to
interpret RICO in the context of the arbitration agreements’ limitations on arbitral
remedial authority. Furthermore, if the arbitrator determined that the agreement
precluded an award of treble damages, the arbitrator would have to decide whether
such a prospective waiver of treble damages is allowed under RICO.
In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, the Supreme Court held that the
question of whether a contract containing an arbitration clause was void under state
law was an issue for the arbitrator and not the court.96 Almost forty years earlier, in
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., the Court held that
issues of fraud in the inducement of the contract were issues for the arbitrator, in
contrast to issues of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause, which were
issues for the court.97 The Court in Buckeye Check Cashing concluded that Prima
Paint controlled the issue before it and rejected the distinction established in
contract law between void and voidable contracts as irrelevant, interpreting the
word “contract,” as used in section two of the FAA to include contracts that are

90. See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 100–01 (2004) (making a similar point with respect to case-by-case
adjudication of validity of class action prohibitions in consumer arbitration agreements).
91. 538 U.S. 401 (2003).
92. Id. at 405–06.
93. Id. at 406–07 (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 407.
95. Id. at 405−07.
96. 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
97. 388 U.S. 395, 403–05 (1967).
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later held to be void.98 Thus, the Court again deferred interpretation and application
of the public law to the privately selected and privately accountable arbitrator.
Most recently, in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, the Court held that
whether an arbitration clause was unconscionable was a decision for the arbitrator
where the arbitration agreement provided for arbitral resolution of that issue.99 As a
condition of employment, Jackson agreed to arbitrate all claims arising out of his
employment. The arbitration agreement further provided, “The Arbitrator, and not
any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve
any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation
of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this
Agreement is void or voidable.”100 Jackson maintained that the agreement to
arbitrate was unconscionable, and Rent-a-Center sought to compel arbitration of the
unconscionability issue.101
The Court applied Prima Paint in a most peculiar manner. The Court considered
the provision delegating issues of enforcement of the arbitration clause as a
separate provision from the provision that the plaintiff would arbitrate all claims
arising out of his employment. The Court read Prima Paint to mean that issues of
unconscionability of the agreement to arbitrate all claims arising out of the
employment relationship were arbitrable; only issues of unconscionability of the
agreement to arbitrate the validity of the clause that provided for arbitral resolution
of the unconscionability issue were for judicial resolution.102
The issue the Court held arbitrable in Rent-a-Center, however, was very
different from the issue the Court held arbitrable in Prima Paint, or even from the
issue the Court held arbitrable in Buckeye Check Cashing. In Prima Paint, the issue
held arbitrable was whether the contract as a whole was voidable because it was
fraudulently induced.103 The voidability of the contract goes to the merits of the
underlying action on the contract; it does not go to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. In
this regard, a claim that the contract as a whole is void is similar to a claim that it is
voidable.
In contrast, because an arbitrator’s authority derives from the parties’ agreement
to arbitrate, an allegation that the arbitration clause, as opposed to the contract as a
whole, is voidable goes to the arbitrator’s authority to act at all. The arbitrator has
an interest in finding the arbitration clause valid because a finding that the
arbitration clause is not valid defeats the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and ensures that
the arbitrator will earn a fee limited to ruling on the threshold jurisdictional issue.
In other words, the arbitrator will earn no fee for adjudicating the merits of the
underlying dispute. Submitting a matter to an adjudicator who has such a personal
financial interest in the resolution of the issue is a basic denial of due process.104

98. Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 448.
99. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
100. Id. at 2775 (quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2777–78.
103. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967).
104. See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (holding that having
the mayor adjudicate traffic offenses violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment where the municipality derives a substantial portion of its budget from traffic
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The Court’s decision in Rent-a-Center may be the high water mark of the Court’s
deferral of critical threshold issues of public law and procedural fairness to
arbitrators and its abdication of judicial responsibility for policing the arbitral
process to ensure that arbitration is a forum in which claimants may effectively
vindicate statutory claims.
The message of these recent Supreme Court decisions to the lower courts is
clear. They are to avoid deciding most issues concerning the validity of the
arbitration provision and instead refer those issues to the arbitrator. Furthermore,
whether the apparent impediments in the arbitration provision will deny the
plaintiff a forum in which to effectively vindicate his or her statutory rights is
speculative until the arbitrator rules. Consequently, under Randolph, the plaintiff
cannot sustain the burden of proof on this issue. This message was not lost on then
Circuit Judge, now Chief Justice, Roberts who, considering Randolph and
PacifiCare, opined:
We take from these recent cases two basic propositions: first, that the
party resisting arbitration on the ground that the terms of an arbitration
agreement interfere with the effective vindication of statutory rights
bears the burden of showing the likelihood of such interference, and
second, that this burden cannot be carried by “mere speculation” about
how an arbitrator “might” interpret or apply the agreement.105
At common law, adjudicators have the authority to deny enforcement of
contracts and contract provisions that are illegal or contrary to public policy.106 The
Supreme Court has recognized, in the context of labor arbitration, that an arbitrator
also has such authority.107 Consequently, taken to its logical extreme, the Court’s
most recent arbitration jurisprudence suggests that a court should not rule on even
the most patently illegal characteristics of the arbitration agreement because it is
“mere speculation” whether the arbitrator will enforce or strike them. The Eighth
Circuit has come close to this approach. In Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co.,108
the district court refused to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs’ claims under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),109 because the arbitration agreement imposed
“procedural terms and remedial limitations [that] appear to be facially inconsistent
with the FLSA statutory claims . . . .”110 The Eighth Circuit chided the district court
for reflecting “outmoded judicial hostility to arbitration that the Supreme Court has
consistently rejected in construing the FAA.”111 The court held that the validity of
fines and the mayor is responsible for the budget).
105. Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis in
original).
106. See generally 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.1 (3d ed.
2004).
107. See W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber, 461
U.S. 757, 767 n.10 (1983) (suggesting that under the contract doctrine of impossibility of
performance, an arbitrator may refuse to enforce a collective bargaining agreement provision
that conflicts with external law).
108. 346 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2003).
109. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2006).
110. Bailey, 346 F.3d at 823.
111. Id.
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the contractual limitations was for the arbitrator to decide, reasoning, “When an
agreement to arbitrate encompasses statutory claims, the arbitrator has the authority
to enforce substantive statutory rights, even if those rights are in conflict with
contractual limitations in the agreement that would otherwise apply.”112 The Eighth
and Eleventh Circuits have refused to invalidate contractual provisions limiting the
statutory right of a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney fees, reasoning that how
the arbitrator will adjudicate the issue is too speculative to justify the conclusion
that arbitration will not allow plaintiffs to vindicate effectively their statutory
rights.113 Some courts have deferred the validity of shortened limitations provisions
to the arbitrator.114 Under this approach, about the only issue that a court might
consider policing is control over selection of the arbitrator.115
Against this background, the Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
Animalfeeds International Corp.116 sticks out like a sore thumb. In Stolt-Nielsen, a
shipper’s contract with shipping companies required arbitration of the shipper’s
claims. The shipper, Animalfeeds, served the shipping companies with a demand
for class action arbitration of claimed antitrust violations. The parties stipulated that
their contract was silent as to class arbitration, which Animalfeeds represented to
mean that no agreement had been reached on the issue.117 The parties agreed to
submit the issue to a panel of arbitrators that issued a finding that the matter could
proceed as a class action arbitration.118 The Supreme Court, however, did not defer

112. Id. at 824.
113. See Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2004); Summers v.
Dillards, Inc., 351 F.3d 1100, 1100 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Siebert v. Amateur Athletic
Union, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Minn. 2006) (similar holding with respect to
contractual provision prohibiting award of punitive damages).
114. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 43−44, 64 (1st Cir. 2006). Even before
these Supreme Court decisions, the Third Circuit had held that the validity of a shortened
limitations period was for the arbitrator to resolve. Great W. Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock, 110
F.3d 222, 231–32 (3d Cir. 1997) (“As to the waiver of state law rights unrelated to the
provision of a judicial forum, we hold only that the inclusion of such waivers in a document
described as an “Arbitration Agreement” cannot be asserted to avoid the arbitration agreed
to therein. Rather, the party challenging the validity of such waivers must present her
challenge to the arbitrator, who will determine the validity and enforceability of the waiver
of asserted state law rights. Thus, here we leave it to the arbitrator to determine whether
Peacock has waived her right to attorney’s fees to a two-year statute of limitations.”).
115. See, e.g., McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 492–94 (6th Cir. 2004); see also
Floss v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 314 (6th Cir. 2000). Even here,
however, some courts have refused to invalidate suspect arbitrator selection provisions on
the ground that the plaintiffs did not meet their burdens under Randolph to show that the
provisions impeded their abilities to effectively vindicate their rights. See Lyster v. Ryan’s
Family Steak Houses, Inc., 239 F.3d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 2001) (enforcing Ryan’s Family
Steak House arbitration agreement finding that plaintiff failed to establish undue harshness,
citing Randolph); see also Penn v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir.
2001) (refusing to enforce agreement to arbitrate because of lack of consideration but
suggesting that attack on arbitrator selection procedure would not meet burden under
Randolph).
116. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
117. Id. at 1765–66.
118. Id. at 1766.
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to the arbitrators’ ruling. Rather, the Court interpreted the FAA as containing a
presumption against class-action arbitration. The Court reasoned that “class-action
arbitration chang[ed] the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be
presumed [that] the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their
disputes to an arbitrator.”119 Although generally a court reviewing an arbitration
award must enforce it as long as the award is arguably based on the contract and as
long as there is any rationale supporting the award,120 the Court chose to ignore
references in the award to the intent of the parties and concluded that there was
only one possible enforceable outcome—denial of class-action arbitration.121 Even
though the Court has generally swept issues of public law to arbitrators for
resolution, in the one case before it where the arbitrators determined that a
particular procedure (class-action arbitration) was appropriate for enforcing
effectively statutory rights, the Court held that the determination was beyond the
arbitrators’ authority.122
The Supreme Court has made mincemeat of the rationale that arbitration merely
shifts the forum for adjudication and does not waive underlying substantive rights
as long as the claimant can effectively vindicate the claims in arbitration as a tool
for policing employer-imposed pre-dispute arbitration mandates. But what of the
state law contracts doctrine of unconscionability? In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, the Supreme Court drew a line between “[g]enerally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, [which] may be applied to
invalidate arbitration agreements,” and “state laws applicable only to arbitration
provisions,”123 which may not because they are preempted by the FAA.124
Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Inc.125 illustrates how powerful a policing tool
the doctrine of unconscionability can be. Brewer brought a class action alleging
violations of numerous Missouri consumer protection statutes.126 Her loan
agreement with Missouri Title contained arbitration and class action waiver
provisions.127 The trial court held the class action waiver unconscionable, severed
it, and ordered the matter to arbitration to determine whether it was suitable for
class arbitration.128 The Missouri Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the
class action waiver was unconscionable because Brewer had no opportunity to

119. Id. at 1775.
120. See, e.g., Brentwood Med. Assocs. v. United Mine Workers, 396 F.3d 237, 241 (3d
Cir. 2005).
121. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1770.
122. See id. (“[T]he arbitration panel imposed its own policy choice and thus exceeded its
powers.”).
123. Id. at 687 (emphasis omitted).
124. Id.
125. 323 S.W.3d 18 (Mo. 2010) (en banc), rev’d 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011). As discussed
infra notes 133–45 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court has since held in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), that the FAA preempts state law of
unconscionability as applied to class action waivers in arbitration agreements. Not
surprisingly, the Court vacated the decision in Brewer and remanded for further proceedings
in light of Concepcion. Missouri Title Loans, Inc. v. Brewer, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011).
126. Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 20.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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negotiate over it and because the claims were so small that they could not
practically be brought individually.129 But the court read Stolt-Nielsen to preclude it
from simply severing the unconscionable class action waiver because Title Loan
had manifested its objection to arbitrating on a class basis. Consequently, in the
court’s view, its only option and the one it pursued was to strike the entire
arbitration agreement as unconscionable.130
At the NAA Due Process Conference, I highlighted several drawbacks to
reliance on the doctrine of unconscionability to police employer-imposed
pre-dispute arbitration mandates. These include the wide variation among the
jurisdictions in applying the doctrine, the ability to use choice of law clauses to
avoid application of the law of jurisdictions that take a liberal approach to
unconscionability, and the need to navigate a minefield of potential FAA
preemptions of state unconscionability law.131 Since then, the Court has dealt two
blows to the unconscionability doctrine that could turn out to be fatal.
As previously discussed, the Court’s decision in Rent-a-Center allows an
employer to avoid judicial determination of the unconscionability issue completely
by inserting a clause providing for arbitral resolution.132 More recently, in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court held that the FAA preempted the
application of California’s unconscionability doctrine to a provision in an
arbitration mandate that prohibited class actions.133
The Concepcions brought a class action alleging false advertising and fraud
when AT&T charged them sales tax on the retail value of phones that it had
advertised as free.134 The arbitration agreement that AT&T imposed on all of its
customers required arbitration on an individual basis.135 Under California law, such
prohibitions on class actions, whether coupled with arbitration provisions or free
standing, were unconscionable in contracts of adhesion involving predictably small
amounts of damages.136 The Ninth Circuit held that the FAA did not preempt
California law because the California rule applied to contracts generally, not just to
contracts for arbitration.137 The Supreme Court reversed.
Although the FAA permits holding arbitration agreements unenforceable on
“such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,”138 the
Court declared that a primary purpose of the FAA is to enforce arbitration
agreements in accordance with their own terms.139 It further maintained, “Requiring
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Id. at 23.
Id. at 21, 24.
Malin, supra note 86, at 380−85.
See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
Id. at 1744.
Id.
Id. at 1746 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal.
AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
Id. at 1748.
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the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of
arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”140
The Court considered arbitration to be a forum poorly suited to class actions. In
the Court’s view, class actions in arbitration would make confidentiality more
difficult.141 The Court was skeptical that arbitrators would have sufficient expertise
to safeguard the rights of absent class members.142 The Court further found it “odd
to think that an arbitrator would be entrusted with ensuring that third parties’ due
process rights are satisfied.”143 It urged that “[t]he absence of multilayered review”
made arbitration a poor forum for class actions.144 The Court continued:
Arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation. In
litigation, a defendant may appeal a certification decision on an
interlocutory basis and, if unsuccessful, may appeal from a final
judgment as well. Questions of law are reviewed de novo and questions
of fact for clear error. In contrast, 9 U.S.C. § 10 allows a court to vacate
an arbitral award only where the award “was procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means”; “there was evident partiality or corruption in
the arbitrators”; “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing
to postpone the hearing . . . or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy[,] or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced”; or if the “arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award . . . was not made.” . . . [R]eview under § 10
focuses on misconduct rather than mistake. And parties may not
contractually expand the grounds or nature of judicial review. We find
it hard to believe that defendants would bet the company with no
effective means of review, and even harder to believe that Congress
would have intended to allow state courts to force such a decision.145
The Court’s analysis is remarkably similar to its analysis of arbitration in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., where the Court held that an employee who
arbitrated his discharge grievance under a collective bargaining agreement was not
precluded from litigating the same discharge under Title VII.146 The Court
reasoned, in part, that the arbitral forum was poorly suited for resolving Title VII
claims. It opined that arbitrators lacked the expertise necessary to interpret and
apply Title VII,147 and that arbitration procedures were too informal for the
adjudication of statutory claims.148 But the Court has since derided GardnerDenver as reflecting now-discredited judicial hostility toward arbitration.149 That

140. Id.
141. Id. at 1750.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1752.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1752 (first three alterations in original) (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted).
146. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
147. Id. at 56−57.
148. See id. at 57.
149. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1470 (2009); see also Gilmer v.
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arbitrators lack the expertise of judges and that arbitration is an informal process is
no longer a basis for preventing adjudication of statutory rights in the arbitral forum
but it is a basis for preventing class-wide arbitration. Hostility, it appears, is in the
eyes of the beholder.
The FAA does not expressly define “arbitration.” The Court has taken it upon
itself to craft a vision of arbitration and attribute that vision to the Congress that
enacted the FAA. The Court’s vision can now be manipulated to render state
contract law impotent in policing employer-imposed arbitration mandates. For
example, consider an employer-imposed arbitration mandate that drastically limits
discovery.150 Under state contract law, such an agreement might be considered
unconscionable. Yet, under AT&T Mobility, the FAA’s command that arbitration
agreements be enforced according to their terms coupled with the Court’s view that
envisions arbitration as an informal, fast, and inexpensive method of dispute
resolution could lead the Court to hold such state law preempted.151
At the NAA Due Process Conference, I called for increased self-regulation as a
partial antidote to judicial abdication of the policing role.152 I recognized the
limitations of self-regulation but suggested that because the arbitration service
providers with the largest shares of the employment arbitration market, AAA and
JAMS, had adopted numerous due process protections and because AAA, notably,
provided that where there was a conflict between its rules and the arbitration
agreement the AAA rules would govern, self-regulation could go a long way to
filling the need for due process protections.153 I specifically noted that AAA and
JAMS continue to require employers to pay all arbitration costs outside of a
nominal filing fee in spite of the Court’s decision in Randolph as an example of
what self-regulation could accomplish.154 I called for further self-regulation,
including a refusal to enforce class action waivers and an insistence that arbitration
provisions not reduce limitations periods.155 Similarly, the NAA has issued
guidelines for arbitrators to use in determining whether to accept an appointment in
an employment case.156
Unfortunately, a recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals threatens to
undermine such self-regulation completely. In Brady v. Williams Capital Group,
L.P., Williams imposed on its employees a requirement that they arbitrate their
claims arising out of their employment in accordance with AAA rules “except as
provided in this Agreement.”157 The arbitration agreement further provided that the
employee and Williams share equally the arbitrator’s fee.158

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 34 n.5 (1991).
150. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 2, at 44 (discussing Ryan’s Family Steak Houses
arbitration agreement, which limited discovery to one deposition).
151. See AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (discussing preemption of state unconscionability
doctrine when applied to mandate a certain level of discovery).
152. Malin, supra note 86, at 396−403.
153. Id. at 398–99.
154. Id. at 401.
155. Id. at 401–03.
156. Policy Statement on Employment Arbitration, NAT’L ACAD. OF ARB. (May 20,
2009), http://naarb.org/due_process.asp.
157. 928 N.E.2d 383, 384 (N.Y. 2010) (emphasis omitted).
158. Id.
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Brady filed an arbitration demand with AAA over Williams’s termination of her
employment. AAA determined that the demand was filed under an employerpromulgated plan, that Williams was responsible for the entire arbitrator’s fee, and
invoiced Williams for a deposit of $42,300 to cover the arbitrator’s anticipated
fee.159 When Williams repeatedly refused to pay, insisting that Brady pay half,
AAA cancelled the arbitration.160 Brady sued to compel Williams to pay or for the
entry of a default judgment against Williams, but the court held that the provision
in the arbitration agreement adopting AAA rules except as otherwise provided in
the Agreement required Brady to pay half of the arbitrator’s fee despite AAA rules
to the contrary.161 Consequently, the court held, under Randolph, Brady had the
burden to prove that the requirement that she pay half of the arbitrator’s fee
precluded her from arbitrating the case.162
If Brady is followed in other jurisdictions, employers can avoid due process
guarantees required by arbitration service providers such as AAA by simply
inserting “except as otherwise provided in this agreement” language into their predispute arbitration mandates. Then they can provide in their agreements for fee
sharing, limitations on remedies, shortened limitations periods, limitations on
discovery, and other provisions that tilt the playing field to their advantage. The
only option for the arbitration service provider is to refuse to administer the
arbitration, and there is evidence that AAA does refuse to administer arbitrations
where a party does not comply with AAA required due process protections.163
Unfortunately, that is not likely to prevent arbitration under the employer’s terms.
There is evidence that where AAA has refused to administer consumer arbitrations
due to protocol violations, the merchant took the case to the National Arbitration
Forum, which administered it.164 Some courts have still compelled arbitration even
though the designated arbitration provider had refused to administer the case on
due process grounds.165
IV. LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
The abdication by courts of their policing responsibilities and the inadequacy of
a system of self-regulation leads to the inescapable conclusion that legislative
reform is needed to curb employer abuses of pre-dispute arbitration mandates that
they impose on their employees. Congress should amend the FAA not by

159. Id. at 385.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 387.
162. Id. at 387–88.
163. See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 76, at 93−94 (discussing AAA refusals
to administer consumer arbitrations for failure to comply with the Consumer Due Process
Protocol). But, there is evidence that AAA does not catch all protocol violations, and even
when it does catch them, AAA will administer the case if arbitration is ordered by a court.
See id. at 89−90 & n.28, 92.
164. See id. at 100.
165. See, e.g., Great W. Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997); Mathews
v. Life Care Ctr. of Am., Inc., 177 P.3d 867 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). But see Martinez v.
Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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prohibiting all pre-dispute arbitration provisions in employment contracts but by
prohibiting those provisions that do not ensure basic due process. Such assurances
include that the employee may be represented by counsel of his or her choice, that
the arbitration demand may be filed at any time within the applicable statute of
limitations, that the arbitrator have authority to order such discovery as is necessary
to ensure a full and fair proceeding, and that the arbitrator have authority to award
any remedy that a court could order.
Beyond these obvious due process guarantees, statutory reform should focus on
the arbitrator appointing agencies and the arbitrator selection process. The
employer unilaterally selects the arbitrator appointing agency when it designs the
arbitration system. An employer who mandates arbitration under AAA rules, for
example, has unilaterally selected AAA as its arbitrator appointing agency.
The enormous importance of the identity and impartiality of the arbitrator
appointing agency is obvious. AAA and other arbitration service providers actively
market their services to employers. The desire to attract and retain employer
business can have a negative effect on the way in which the arbitration appointing
agency administers the arbitration system. For example, in the early development
of the AAA Employment Disputes Panel, employers believed that labor arbitrators
would favor employees and expressed strong preferences for excluding them from
the panel. The initial AAA Employment Disputes Panel excluded most labor
arbitrators.166 To its credit, AAA no longer does this, but more recently JAMS
abandoned its refusal to administer arbitration agreements with class action waivers
because of pressure from its business clients.167
There are two ways in which an arbitrator appointing agency can slant the
process to favor employers. First, the agency decides who it will list on its roster of
arbitrators. Thus, the amended FAA should require that agencies employ objective
and neutral criteria for determining whether to admit an arbitrator to their rosters.
Agencies should bear a heavy burden of justifying the systematic exclusion of
certain types of individuals from their rosters.168 Employer-promulgated mandatory
arbitration systems that employ appointing agencies who fail to use uniform
objective neutral criteria for listing arbitrators on their rosters should be prohibited.

166. Lisa B. Bingham & Debra J. Mesch, Decision Making in Employment and Labor
Arbitration, 39 INDUS. REL. 671, 674 (2000).
167. See Adam Klein & Nantiya Ruan, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Class
Action Disputes: From the Perspective of Plaintiffs’ Counsel, in ARBITRATION 2008: U.S.
AND CANADIAN ARBITRATION: SAME PROBLEMS, DIFFERENT APPROACHES, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SIXTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 142, 150 (Patrick
Halter & Paul D. Staudohar eds. 2009) [hereinafter NAA 61ST ANN. MTG. PROC.].
168. Employers often fear that labor arbitrators will fail to distinguish between the just
cause standard commonly employed in labor arbitrations over discipline and discharge from
the narrower, less employee-protective standards involved in employment cases. Professors
Bingham and Mesch found no basis for the assumption that labor arbitrators could not
distinguish between the two types of cases and standards. Bingham & Mesch, supra note
166, at 687–88. However, they also found that labor arbitrators were more likely to reinstate
an employee than employment arbitrators faced with the same facts. Id. at 683. Arguably, a
systematic exclusion of labor arbitrators from an agency’s roster skews the roster against
employees without any substantive justification.
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Doing so will eliminate the temptation for agencies to curry favor with repeat
customer employers by making their biased systems legally useless.
The second way in which an agency can slant the process to favor employers is
by controlling the composition of the specific panel of arbitrators given to the
parties in a specific dispute. The desire for repeat business can be a powerful
incentive for agencies to give their customers what the agencies think the
customers want. In labor cases, for example, AAA tailors its panels in an effort to
meet the needs of the parties in light of the particular dispute.169 Such tailoring may
be appropriate where the agency has been selected mutually by the union and the
employer. Like an arbitrator, the agency must curry favor with both adversaries to
ensure their repeat business. Such tailoring is entirely inappropriate where the
employer is the only party that controls whether the agency will see repeat
business.
Random selection from the overall roster is a method of composing a specific
panel that reduces a repeat player’s ability to select the same arbitrator for multiple
cases.170 The amended FAA should require, as a condition of enforcing mandatory
arbitration provisions, that the arbitration system use random selection or a similar
unbiased method for composing the panel from which the parties will select their
arbitrator.
The FAA amendment should also mandate strict disclosure rules for
employment arbitrators. Professor Colvin found a significant repeat-arbitrator
effect where employers were significantly more likely to prevail when appearing
before an arbitrator multiple times.171 This does not necessarily reflect arbitrator
bias. However, it is relevant to parties selecting an arbitrator. Consequently,
arbitrators should be required to disclose prior dealings with parties, their lawyers,
and their lawyers’ firms.172
Finally, the amendment should address class actions. Class action waivers serve
no purpose other than to insulate employers from liability for low value claims, but
the Supreme Court has now insulated such waivers from state law invalidation
when they are paired with an arbitration mandate.173 In one sense, the Court got it
right. Class actions do not belong in arbitration. Space constraints do not allow me
to elaborate fully on the problems encountered when arbitrating class actions, and
others have already done so.174 As is universally recognized, in class actions, due

169. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 217 (1997).
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experiences with the same arbitrator, there is nothing to stop them from agreeing to use that
arbitrator in another case. In such circumstances, the repeat player effect is balanced in much
the same way as it is balanced in labor arbitration.
171. Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 28, at 430−31.
172. See Alim v. KBR-Halliburton, 331 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. App. 2011) (vacating award
because arbitrator failed to disclose that six years earlier he presided over a case with a
related company represented by the same counsel who represented the employer in the
current case).
173. See supra notes 132–51 and accompanying text.
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Story, in 1 PRAC. LAW INST., 10TH ANNUAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION
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process concerns are heightened because absent class members can be bound by the
outcome. In class action arbitrations, the arbitrator has the burden to ensure due
process and protect the rights of absent class members.175 But the arbitrator has
been mutually selected by the named claimants and the respondent, raising the
question why should absent class members who have had no role in arbitral
selection be forced to rely on the arbitrator to protect them. The problem is
illustrated graphically when we consider class settlements. The adjudicator must
ensure that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for all class members.
Moreover, absent class members must be given notice of a proposed settlement and
an opportunity to raise objections. Consider what would occur in class-action
arbitration when absent class members raise objections to a proposed settlement.
The named claimants and the respondents who agreed to and will advocate for the
settlement are the same parties who chose the arbitrator who will now rule on the
absent class members’ objections. From the objectors’ perspective, the deck is
stacked against them because they are litigating their objections before an arbitrator
selected by their opponents. There is no way to cure this appearance of arbitrator
bias. Class actions belong in court and not in arbitration. Any legislative solution
should ban the waiver of the right to bring a class action in court.
Proponents of the AFA argue that if the abuses are eliminated and arbitration
procedures are truly fair, they will be no faster and no cheaper than litigation and
employers will no longer use them. The Raytheon experience suggests that they
may be right.176 But that would only mean that regulation would have the same
effect as prohibition. That is not an argument against regulation.
When the Due Process Protocol was adopted, it provided valuable guidance to
all parties trying to get employment arbitration right, including employers,
arbitration service providers, and arbitrators.177 Experience since the Protocol has
revealed numerous shortcomings.178 Amending the FAA to ensure fair employment
arbitration processes would pick up where the Protocol left off.179
A complete prohibition on pre-dispute arbitration mandates in employment
contracts will not serve the interests of employees in having an accessible forum in
which to adjudicate their claims. It will not serve the interests of employers in
INSTITUTE 307, 307 (2005); Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L.
REV. 185 (2006); Klein & Ruan, supra note 167; Andrew Remy Norton, Note, Rules for a
New Game: Finding a Workable Solution for Applying Class Actions to the Arbitration
Process, 2 J. DISP. RESOL. 495 (2005); Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The
Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711 (2006).
175. For a discussion from an arbitrator’s perspective, see Barry Winograd, An
Introduction to Mandatory Arbitration and Class Action Waivers, in NAA 61ST ANN. MTG.
PROC. 127, 138−40.
176. See Coleman, supra note 58.
177. See Jacquelin F. Drucker, The Protocol in Practice: Reflections, Assessments, Issues
for Discussion, and Suggested Actions, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 345, 349 (2007).
178. See Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty
Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 165
(2005).
179. I am not the only one to call for such amendments to the FAA. See, e.g., Ellis, supra
note 2, at 47–50; Letter from William H. Holly, Jr., President, National Academy of
Arbitrators, to Senator Russ Feingold App. 7 (Oct. 13, 2009), available at
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having an adjudication procedure that can resolve claims quicker and cheaper. It
will only serve the interests of that segment of the plaintiffs’ bar that wish to
continue to play the lottery. We will not know whether statutory reform will
preserve the accessibility, speed, and cost-effectiveness of the arbitral forum, but it
is worth trying—the worst we end up with is a de facto ban.

